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The Commission has the honour to send you the
report it has drawn up at the request of the
Heads of Government on the transformation of
the whole complex of the relations of Member
States into a European Union.
In preparing its report it has been alive to the
changes which have come about since European
Union was first discussed at the meeting of
Heads of State or Government in October 1972.
Since then the economic crisis and the changes in
international relations, far from strengthening
Community solidarity and leading to an asser-
tion of Europe s identity vis-a-vis the rest of the
world, have marked a further check, and perhaps
a retreat, in the process of Europeanconstruc-
tion. The Member States, tempted by purely
national solutions, have faced international dis-
cussion divided. The Community institutions
have been too weak, and the means at their
disposal too meagre, to counteract this tendency.
Yet these troubles do not mean that we must
forgo the aim of European Union, or that to take
counsel together on the nature, scope, fields of
competence and powers of that Union would be
premature or meaningless in the present situa-
tion.
The Heads of Government meeting in Paris in
December 1974, confirmed their desire ' to agree
as soon as possible on an overall concept of
European Union' and ' the importance they
attach to the reports to be made by the Com-
m unity institutions
European unity is not of course the answer to all
society s problems. Every country has first to
look to itself to find the will and the means to
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bring about political, economic and social pro-
gress. Likewise our Member States and the
Community cannot deny the need for extensive
and intensive cooperation with all our partners
in the world.
But the problems to be tackled .are beyond the
capacity of the Member States acting alone; in
any case, going it .alone is idle in the face of the
interdependence of our economies. World-wide
cooperation can only be inadequate given the
weak structures and the disproportionate
strengths involved.
If these efforts to reform our economic and
social structures were conducted separately, the
implications in terms of costs, and hence of
competitive capacity, would very soon be seen to
be intolerable, and the efforts would be ended
for the sake of economic balance within and
without. Europe is the right context in which
to achieve certain aspirations of peoples desiring
at once security and change.
Internationally, only through European unity can
we regain together the independence we have
lost on our own-that independence which is
vital to any fresh initiatives.
European Union, the overall concept based on
these principles, will require efficient structures
and appropriate means. These will not be
created
, .
as our present difficulties have shown
unless we get back to the basic idea underlying
the Community-that of organizing European
construction by conferring competences on com-
mon institutions in areas where Europe
prosperity, progress and influence in the world
can thereby be enhanced.
To that simple idea and its implications, partic-
ularly for the institutions, this report is devo-
red. In studying the idea and formulating the
suggestions that arise out of it the Commission
has not tried to put down exhaustive, detailed
plans. It has limited itself to setting out what
should and could be the elements of Union in
certain major fields.The Commission is convinced that European
Union must emerge from a political debate
involving the Community institutions, Govern-
ments, Parliaments and political, economic and
social forces representing public opinion in our
countries.
But the Commission would stress that it is not
only by debate about the detailed nature of this
perspective that we will make progress towards
its realisation. It is by action to meet the
challenges which continually arise that the exist-
ing Community can develop towards Union by
demonstrating its will to go beyond simple
coordination and to carry into effect common
policies. Without this there will be no firm
foundations for the construction of
Union. Without this there will be no founda-
tions for the construction of Union. With it, the
men and women of Europe will become more
and more aware of the relevance to their own
lives and problems of the more ambitious aim of
Union.
This remains the perspective in which the Com-
munity immediate action must be viewed and
tackled if it is to be acceptable to all the Member
States despite the differing degrees of effort and
sacrifice they will be called upon to make.
To start with, the Member States must recognize
that the Community is the framework in which
the battle against inflation and recession has to
be fought, and at the same time is the essential
means for international cooperation. And they
must act accordingly.
Secondly, the Community institutions have to be
reinvigorated and made more democratic with
all possible speed. The direct election of the
European Parliament in the near future will be a
shot in the arm for the Community, and will give
fresh reasons for interest in it to the political and
social forces without whose support no action to
speak of is possible.
In mapping out our future path, we must draw
fully on the resources of our institutions as they
now exist and, on the firm foundations laid by
our Treaties, draw up common actions to defend
our interests and recreate an economic monetary
and social situation which can give lastingsatis-
faction.
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European UnionI.  Scope and Nature
of European Union
1. At the Paris Conference of October 1972 the
Heads of State or Government 'set themselves
the major objective of transforming, before the
end of the present decade and with the fullest
respect for the Treaties already signed, the whole
complex of the relations of Member States into a
European Union
This statement certainly does not go far enough
to give a clear and unimpeachable definition of
the essential features of European Union.
Nevertheless, read in the light of the statements
put out at The Hague and Copenhagen and of
the Copenhagen document on the European
Identity, it offers certain basic ideas which could
place further thinking on the right lines.
2. There is at present a series of forms of
cooperation in a variety of institutions covering
the whole complex of the relations of Member
States . There are first of all the Communities
and then the system of political cooperation, the
Council of Europe, WEU and a whole range of
organizations going beyond the boundaries of
Europe. There are also certain types of cooper-
ation (for instance in cultural matters) which are
not organized in any specIal framework, and
forms of bilateral cooperation which are more or
less permanent.
It is worth asking what meaning should be
attached to the expression 'whole complex of
relations It does not seem logical to assume
that European Union must necessarily encom-
pass every type of relation between the Member
States. That very general expression would
rather seem to suggest a refusal to define from
the outset which field would fall within the
competence of the Union; definition of these
fields will call for an enimently political de-
cision. Outside these fields there will inevitably
be areas in which the Member States will main-
tain various types of relations with each other
but which will, for some time at least and
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possibly for all time, remain outside the compe~
tence of the Union. Nevertheless, it seems reas-
onable to consider that the Union could well be
given responsibility for those fields which are
covered or likely to be covered by permanent
organized cooperation between all the Member
States.
The Commission does not feel that the time is
yet ripe for drawing up an exhaustive list of
these areas. It has therefore confined itself to
dealing with those aspects which are of major
political importance for the future of the Union.
3. Since it is necessary to ensure that in the
fields of competence allocated to the Union,
affairs shall ' be organized in a coherent fahion
the possibility ofa number of independent and
parallel organizations must be excluded. This
does not mean that within the Union, depending
on their nature, different subjects may not be
dealt with by different methods or under differ-
ent legal rules.
4. European Union will naturally rest on cer-
tain general principles which are held by all the
Member States. These principles, which have
repeatedly been reaffirmed, whether in the exist-
ing Treaties or in statements approved by the
meetings of the Heads of Government, are demo-
cracy, freedom of opinion, the free movement of
people and of ideas, participation by the peoples
through their freely elected representatives, and
the protection of human rights. The aim of
European Union must be social progress and
economic development for the peoples of Europe
and the diminution of regional and social dispar-
ities.
5. In international relations European Union
working for peace, security, stability and cooper~
ation with the Third World, will be the expres-
sion of the European identity defined in the
Copenhagen document.
Point 16 of the final communique; Sixth General
Report, point 5; Bull. EC 10-1972, Part One, Chap-
ter I.6. There is one basic aspect of recent develop-
ments in our society which no discussion of
European Union should overlook: growing resis-
tance to attempts to centralize power. Pressure
is being brought to bear throughout .our coun-
tries in order to bring power closer to the citizen
and to confer greater powers on regional and
local authorities.
It is neither the purpose nor the ambition of this
report to outline a model for the distribution of
powers at different levels (European, national
local). However, the Commission believes that
any power-tranfer process at European level
need not and must not be allowed to impede the
attainment of a greater degree of decentraliza-
tion. On the contrary, the establishment of
European Union is one aspect of the more
general historical process of redistribution of
decision-making powers throughout society
enabling both the efficiency of public administra-
tion to be raised and the involvement of the
citizen to be intensified.
The legal and geographical
coherence  of  the Union
7. In theory, two types of system may 
envisaged. The European Union could retain
in respect of all matters within its competence
the principle of legal unity already recognized by
the present Communities. It is implicit in this
principle that the Union institutions would
exercice their powers in all fields within their
competence in relation to all the Member
States. On the other hand the Union could 
regarded as a network of special agreements
involving all or only some of the Member States
depending on the subject.
8. The choice to be made here is impor-
tant. The Commission feels that only the first
alternative is compatible with the political objec-
tive of a union and can provide a basis for
growing solidarity between different
nations. Moreover, it alone can provide the
European Union with the cohesion that will be
essential, in particular at the level of its institu-
tions, and that it alone is consonant with the
concept of a 'European Identity
Naturally, this should not preclude the possibil-
ity of the Union s actions and decisions being so
constituted as to make allowance for specific
situations, whether national, regional or local.
9. The European Union must be given legal
personality in international relations.
10. The European Union must, like the present
Communities, be open to the accession of other
European countries which have a democratic
pluralist political system and are able to assume
the burdens and responsibilities that go with
membership of the Union. It seems reasonable
that the conditions for the accession of such
countries should be similar in character to those
set out in the present Treaties, one of which is
the unanimous agreement of the Member States.
Division  of  fields  of  competence
between Union and Member  States
11. Given the dynamic character of the Union
and the extremely varied forms of action it may
take, it is necessary to distinguish, in the rest of
this document, between the 'competence of the
Union , which will be used to mean the  areas 
which the Union can act, and the 'powers of the
Union , meaning the  ways and means  by which it
acts. The nature and scope of its powers may
vary with the subject matter and may also
develop with the passing of time.
12. No more than the existing Communities
have done so, European Union is not to give
birth to a centralizing super-state. Con-
sequently, and in accordance with the  principe
de subsidiarite,  the Union will be given respo
sibility only for those matters which the Member
States are no longer capable of dealing with
efficiently. If the Union is to be given compe-
S. 5/75tence in areas not specified in the Act of Consti-
tution, the Act will have to be amended by a
procedure probably entailing ratification by all
the Member States.
Hence, the competence of the Union will be
limited to what is assigned to it, meaning that its
fields of competence will be specified in the Act
of Constitution, other matters being left to the
Member States. There is nothing new 
this. As in the existing Communities, the Union
could be given competence of three types: exclu-
sive, concurrent and potential, as explained
below. The terms on which competence may be
exercised may vary from type to type.
Of course, in deciding on the Union s compe-
tence , application of the  principe de subsidiarite
is restricted by the fact that the Union must 
given extensive enough competency for its cohe-
sion to be ensured.
13. Thus there will be a number of matters
which fall  exclusively  within Union competence;
one such, already within the exclusive compe-
tence of the Community, is commercial policy.
Between the two there is bound to be 
extensive border area in which both Union and
States may have competence.
14. An expression which might be used to
describe this border area is that of  concurrent
competence, which is to be seen in numerous
provisions of the Treaties establishing the Eur-
opean Communities: Article 43 (agricultural
policy) and Article 75 (transport) are good
examples. Under this arrangement, both Union
and Member States are entitled to deal with the
problems concerned. The Union would assert
its authority only when it felt the need-for
instance, by deciding to act only in respect of
certain aspects of any given matter. It might
also enact outline legislation to cover the whole
field, specifying the areas reserved respectively
for the Union itself and for the Member
States. The Member States would then remain
free to act on all aspects on which the Union had
not taken action.
S. 5/75
Here it is worth asking how consistency can be
secured between action by the Union and action
by the Member States. The answer is that
Union law takes precedence over national
law. Clearly, coordination between the two
types of action cannot be provided simply by
legal texts or by establishing procedures: it must
also rest at any given time on the balance of the
political forces involved.
15. The Union should be dynamic in character
and flexible in structure, so that it can adapt to
political reality and to the requirements of a
changing society.
16. Concurrent competence can help towards
this end, as a list in the Act of Constitution
would indicate among other things fields in
which the Union would not make immediate use
of its competence, but act later, within limits
which it would itself determine.
17. There could be areas for which it is agreed
in principle that they might in due course come
within the competence of the Union, but which it
is not felt .appropriate to entrust to the Union
from the outset.
In such cases , the concept of  potential  compe-
tence might be applied, as in the case of Article
84(2) of the EEC Treaty, relating to sea and air
transport. The field in question would be
placed within the competence of the Union, but a
decision on the scope and nature of the Union
powers and the date on which the Union would
begin to exercise them could be left to be made
later by a special procedure.
18. As to this procedure, it would therefore be
reasonable to leave the choice of moment up to
the Union institutions, although the actual trans-
fer of powers to the Union would require explicit
approval by the Member States in compliance
with procedures created for the purpose, offering
them the necessary assurances, which, in all
important cases, will involve approval of na-
tional parliaments or other constitutional proce-
dures applicable in the Member States.Mention might be made here, though purely as a
guide, of Article 84(2) of the EEC Treaty, Article
95 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 201 of the
EEC Treaty. It will be remembered that Article
201 requires the Council's decision to be adop-
ted by the Member States 'in accordance with
their respective constitutional require-
ments . However, the procedure would be quite
different from one involving. amendment of the
Treaty.
As the areas concerned would be those where the
Member States had already agreed in principle to
confer competence on the Union, they would
clearly be bound, once the Union was esta-
blished, to refrain from any action which in the
long term could jeopardize the Union s exercise
of its competence.
Exercise  of  the powers
of  the Union
19. In the areas of Union competence, the
Union institutions, like the institutions of the
existing Communities, will need direct decision-
making and supervisory powers; they must also
be given financial instruments; finally, a judicial
function must be created on the basis of the
current jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.
The rules laying down how the Union will use all
these powers and instruments will be considered
in Chapter III, which deals with the institutions.
. 20. The exercise of such direct powers and the
use of particular instruments does not conflict
with the reservation to the Member States of
substantial room for manceuvre. This naturally
applies to areas where the Union and the Mem-
ber States have concurrent competence; but it
might also apply in areas of exclusive Union
competence where Member States might be con-
sidered as being in some way the agent of the
Union.
This would be the case if, as would seem
reasonable subject to the above reservations, the
two following methods were still used:
(i) harmonization of national legislation, with a
view to removing obstacles to competition or to
securing healthy conditions for it;
(ii) coordination of national policies on certain
matters as a means of bringing about their
convergence.
21. Harmonization of legislation is carried out
in the EEC by means of directives, which simply
state the results to be achieved while leaving the
Member States free to decide on the methods;
directives are not addressed to the individuals
concerned but to States, which have to imple-
ment them within a national legal system. The
use of the directive has been criticized on a
number of valid grounds. The procedure has
been found to be cumbersome, for several years
elapse between presentation of the Commission
proposal to the Council and implementation of
the directive, as a result of the time required by
the Member States to translate the provisions of
the directive-which are not directly applica-
ble-into national law. Although the objection
is less serious in areas where rep~ated amend-
ments are not the rule, such as company law
more suitable methods should be sought for
technical amendments with limited, transient
objectives. Extensive use should be made in the
Union of outline legislation, delegating rule-mak-
ing powers on the Executive subject to adequate
arrangements for parliamentary control.
A flexible instrument such as the directive should
remain in use in the Union, even if it is issued
only in areas where binding rules can be con-
fined to important points rather than details.
In any event the Commission feels that it would
not be right to reserve whole areas for legislation
through directives (as in Article 100 of the EEC
Treaty); it would be better to leave it to the
Union institutions to choose between a directive
and directly applicable law.
22.  The coordination of national policies  raises
the question of the conditions in which this can
be pursued efficiently when the aim is to bring
about a real convergence of policies or to achieve
common objectives.
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of mandatory common principles by the Union
institutions, the introduction of appropriate
common instruments and the effective checking
of national measures for their conformity to the
principles and their ability to achieve the aims set
by the Union. Where this checking gave a
negative result, there should, as in the present
Communities, be evident consequences (for
example, the Member State forbidden to give
effect to the measure, or financial support from
the Union withheld, or both). If, then, the
coordination of national policies is to go beyond
more concerted action and lead to a common
policy pursued on a decentralized basis, the
Union must have certain powers of its own.
The experience of the Community is illuminating
in this connection. In sectors where there were
no Community instruments or rules, or where
they were inadequate, governments have not
been capable on their own of bringing into being
and maintaining with the necessary continuity
the will to act on their national structures and
guide development towards common objectives.
purely intergovernmental approach may
indeed give rise to manifestations of solidarity,
but these are necessarily short-lived and lack the
requisite political force.
23. To state that the attainment of genuine
common policies and action depends on the
Union being endowed with its own powers and
instruments rather than on mere cooperation
between the Member States does not, however
mean that there can be no such cooperation
within the Union.
There may be areas which fall within the general
competence of the Union but where the Union
cannot or need not yet be given powers of its
own. Here it would be useful to organize
cooperation within the Union. Such cooper-
ation could, moreover, help to promote agree-
ment on certain basic options and so, in appro-
priate fields, lead at a later stage to the Union
being given powers of its own.
There may also be areas where it would not be
considered necessary to give the Union its own
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powers but to establish organized forms of
cooperation subsidiary to the exercise of the
Union s own powers.
24. The fact that there are areas of organized
cooperation within the Union should not mean
watering down its characteristic features and the
purpose for which it exists. The originality of
the Union (as of the Communities from which it
will take over) lies in the fact that it is given and
exercises its own powers. The nature and scope
of these powers must therefore be broad enough
to give the Union the dynamism it needs, and
this will exert a positive influence on cooperation
arrangements.
25. The Member States will of course remain
free to develop the most diverse forms of cooper-
ation either between themselves or with non-
member countries in areas which are not within
the competence of the Union.
It would nevertheless be necessary to stress that
cooperation outside the Union system should in
no case be allowed to obstruct the exercise of the
Union s powers nor to hamper the development
of the Union.II. The Fields
of Competence of the Union
The Construction
of an  Integrated Economic  and  Social Unit
26. Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome lays down
clearly the task of the Community, which is '
promote throughout the Community a harmo-
nious development of economic activities, a con-
tinuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability , an accelerated raising of the standard of
living and closer relations between the States
belonging to it'.
27. Although this was a very general objective,
the powers and the instruments and resources
allocated to the institutions to carry it out
concerned only some of the factors that deter-
mine economic and social development. For the
rest, it was not thought necessary to go beyond
coordination of national policies.
The Community has the powers and instruments
needed to make the common market operate, to
implement a common commercial policy and to
enforce the rules on competition.
The Community also has a common agricultural
policy. The Treaty contains the necessary basis
for the introduction of a common transport
policy. In the social field, it has  inter alia  the
powers needed to ensure freedom of movement
for workers. Further, the Social Fund has gra-
dually expanded its role, placing more and more
emphasis on structural objectives; it has thus
become a first instrument in a European employ-
ment policy. In the regional field, too, the
recently created Fund should have a significant
effect on the employment situation of the Com-
munity through the improvement of economic
structures. Similarly a number of common
instruments are available to the Community in
the area of research, though these are largely
confined to the nuclear field at present.
The Community has also developed a cooper~
ation and development aid policy based on
association 'agreements and on other instruments
such as its geneqlized preferences scheme.
28. The gradual implementation of the Treaty
0 bjectives in .all these fields has resulted in a
greater integration and closer interpenetration of
the economies concerned and, by creating a large
market, has helped to improve welfare and
promote economic growth in the original mem-
ber countries. Once the initial period of adjust-
ment is over, the new Member States will
assuredly feel the same beneficial effects as w~ll.
The integration of the member countries' econo-
mies and economic developments at internation-
allevel have, however, brought to light a number
of problems that had been tackled only indirectly
by the authors of the Treaty, who did not
provide any specific instruments for dealing with
and resolving such problems. However devel-
opments in the economic and social fields have
made it essential that these problems be resolved
if other objectives laid down in the Treaty are to
be attained and if the Community is to be in a
position to respond to new needs.
The Community has therefore attached more
and more importance to achieving the conver-
gence of national economic policies, the narrow-
ing of differences in economic structures, an
industrial policy, an energy policy, an environ~
ment policy, a research policy, etc.
29. The results of these attempts to give eco-
nomic integration more substance have, how-
ever, been meagre. Several factors, such as
changes in the world economic situation, the
I In the Community of Six, internal trade as a
proportion of total trade rose from less than 30% to
more than 50% between 1958 and 1972. During the
same period trade between the Six rose by 840%; nor
did this appear to slow down the expansion of the
Community s external trade which grew at the same
dynamic rate as world trade overall (350%).
The gross domestic product of the Member States of
the Community of Six rose at an annual rate of 5%
between 1958 and 1974, compared with 3.9% in the
United States.
S. 5/75temptation to seek national solutions in times of
crisis, structural disparities and the divergent
trends of the Member States' economies, but also
the inadequacy of the Community s decision-
making process, the weaknesses of its institution-
al structure .and the Community s lack of com-
prehensive and extensive means of intervention
and powers, account for the slow pace of pro-
gress in this area. Furthermore the extent-pro-
bably excessive-to which Community policies
have been viewed in isolation has made it
difficult to deal effectively with their implications
in other areas (for instance, the effects of the
agricultural policy on certain regions).
In particular, experience has shown how fruitless
it is to attempt to coordinate national policies
without the support of effective means of action
at Community level.
While past setbacks are an indication of the scale
of the difficulties to be overcome, they do not
invalidate the objective of economic and mon-
etary union, which was reasserted by the Heads
of Government in Paris on 9 and 10 December
1974, but call for a better definition of this
objective backed up by the creation of the
necessary facilities.
30. Both internal and external economic devel-
opments mean that the public authorities are
having to intervene more-not only in matters of
a general nature but also in specific fields. If
they are not conceived as part of a European
approach, their actions may often prove mutu-
ally damaging and shift difficulties onto each
other s economies.
The difficulties resulting in several instances
from the incomplete nature of the common
policies must first be resolved by an overall
policy.
If the economic interests of the Union and its
Member States are to be protected, the interpen-
etration of the economies concerned must be
strengthened and the structural problems with
which the States cannot cope individually and
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which now hamper a harmonious development
of the Community must be tackled and resolved
jointly.
The need for Community responses to a number
of fresh problems, such as the protection of the
environment and the promotion of research, is
also making itself increasingly felt.
Finally, the economies of the member countries
are by their very nature open economies; they
cannot hope to find refuge in isolation to solve
their internal problems. None of them is big
enough to cope alone with an international
economic situation marked by uncertainty,
change and ever-increasing competition. On
the contrary, experience has shown that by
strengthening their internal solidarity and joint
action the member countries are better able to
defend their interests, make internal structural
adjustments and participate more effectively in
the field of international cooperation.
31. The Union should therefore continue to
,tim for the main Community objective: eco-
nomic and monetary union. This entails giving
it competence, powers, and means of action in
five main fields:
(i) monetary policy;
(ii) budgetary expenditure;
(iii) budgetary revenue;
(iv) improving economic structures so as to
help reduce imbalances;
(v) social affairs.
Before these fields are dealt with, consideration
should be given to general scope for economic
and social action.
General features of means of action
in the economic field
32. In the effort to confer greater substance on
the process of Community integration, an endea-
vour has been made to develop the possibilitiesimplicit in the Treaties, particularly in the EEC
Treaty, although it should also not be forgotten
that adaptations to the EEC Treaty are allowed
under Article 236.
For instance, increasing use has been made of
certain articles of general application, such as
Article 103 for countercyclical measures, Article
100 in connection with the harmonization of
national legislation and Article 235 in connec-
tion with structural measures. There are, how-
ever, legal limits to what can be done in this
way, and they can add a further obstacle to the
difficulties inherent in the decisions to be taken.
While it is inevitable and even desirable that
during an intermediate period efforts to make
good use of the possibilities implicit in the
Treaties should continue, the conclusion to be
drawn from what has been said above is that the
creation of European Union should also make it
possible to go beyond the present limits by
explicitly vesting new powers and new fields of
competence in the European institutions.
33. How is this extension of the Union s pow-
ers to be defined?
Two lines of approach are possible. The first
-typical mainly of the ECSC and Euratom
Treaties but in some respects of the EEC Treaty
too-is the treaty-law, which would lay down in
detail the areas covered by the Union and the
ways and means by which it could act in each of
these areas. The other line of approach, that of
the outline treaty, would give certain general
powers to the Union while at the same time
setting limits to action by the Union and stating
certain fundamental objectives. The experience
of the Communities, particularly the difficulties
encountered in implementing a treaty-law such
as the ECSC Treaty, has shown that this second
approach is more in line with require-
ments. This will be even truer than before as
the Union will have to deal with a multitude of
matters no longer merely to ensure the free
movement' of the factors of production, but to
render coherent the economic development of
the Community as a whole.
34. Intervention by the Union in those fields
should .always be consonant with the  principe de
subsidiarite  already mentioned. The Union
aim, therefore, would be to assume direct
responsibility for problems for the solution of
which the range of efficient action available to
the Member States is insufficient. At the same
time, it would endeavour to avoid divergent
responses from the Member States which would
threaten the cohesion of the Union.
To this end, it is necessary:
(a) to provide an overall framework for na-
tional policies by introducing common rules; and
(b) to give the institutions of the Union their
own instruments and facilities for exerting direct
influence on certain structures or certain factors
of economic development.
35. So far the Community has tended to rely
more on the implementation of action of the first
type. but there is a good case for assigning
growing importance, in the European Union, to
direct action.
Simply to coordinate national policies closely
could create constant tension between the need
to obey the common rules and the political
responsibility of national governments which
have to face up to very rapidly changing eco-
nomic situations, political balances which differ
from country to country and social pressures
which are sometimes contradictory. In addi-
tion, the mere establishment of rules and general
machinery would not enable the Union to act on
economic realities with the necessary degree of
freedom and selectivity. On the other hand
attaching greater weight to the instruments of
direct intervention would have a more important
advantage: it would allow greater flexibility in
coordinating national policies and would, there-
fore, leave the Member States with the freedom
of action they require.
Resolution of the Council and of the Representa-
tives of the Governments of the Member States of 22
March 1971 on the attainment by stages of economic
and monetary union in the Community; OJ C28 of
27 . 1971.
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undermining the disciplines which are still neces-
sary, particularly with regard to the free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital and
to compliance with the rules on competi-
tion. On the contrary, as recent experience has
shown, providing a greater scope for direct
action of a selective nature would facilitate
compliance with the common rules.
The powers of the Union and the instruments of
intervention with which it will be provided
concern only a number of well-defined compon-
ents of economic and social policy. The auth-
orities in the Member States, whether national or
regional, will still, of course, be free to act
autonomollsly in a large number of fields (for
instance, in a great many matters concerning tax
policy).
Powers in monetary matters
36. The achievement in due course of Mon-
etary Union is a precondition for economic
integration within the Union and its cohesion in
the world at large.
In an economic union, whatever its institutional
structure:
(i) interaction between the Member States in
the monetary field is direct and rapid;
(ii) money, being the vehicle for all economic
transactions, determines not only the develop-
ment of private transactions, but also the possib-
ility of administering at Union level a whole
range of policies such as agriculture policy,
external trade policy, competition policy, the free
movement of capital and so on.
The European Union will thus have to possess
centralized decision-making power in the mon-
etary field. In other words, the ultimate objec~
tive should be for monetary resources to be an
exclusive field of competence of the Union, just
as the common customs tariff is already.
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37. For this purpose the Union will have to
have its own central bank-probably of a federal
type-or a common system of central banks (the
choice will be determined mainly by political
considerations),. which will have to manage:
(i) at home, the liquidity of the banking system
and of the economy in general, and
(ii) policy on exchange rates with countries
outside the Union, which mean.s the pooling of
reserves.
One of the institutional problems this raises is
that of the relations between the central bank (or
the Community system of central banks) and the
political authorities of the Union. At present
thinking on this problem varies quite considera~
bly from one Member State to another, as does
the degree of independence which each central
bank enjoys vis-a-vis the government; for
instance, in the Federal Republic of Germany the
central bank enjoys a relatively high degree of
autonomy guaranteed in fact by the Constitu-
tion, whereas in France it is much more depen~
dent on the government. In the Union, various
forms of organization are still possible, but it
none the less seems desirable to aim at a fairly
high degree of independence.
38. Once the ultimate objective of exclusive
competence for the Union in the monetary field
is accepted, the next question to be settled is how
this is to be achieved.
In the texts adopted by the Council in 1971
progress towards economic and monetary union
was to be achieved mainly by putting the follow-
ing principles into practice:
(a) an increasingly more marked and binding
coordination of the short-term and medium-term
economic policies of the member countries;
(b) the extension and strengthening of mon-
etary and financial solidarity between member
countries;
(c) the development of a Community exchange
system designed first to limit and then to narrow
gradually the margins of fluctuation between
member countries' currencies. In a final stagethe national currencies could be incorporated
into a common currency or could continue to
circulate, in which case, however, they would be
convertible at fixed and irreversible exchange
rates.
39. This method has not enabled us to make
the progress hoped for.
However, without going into the reasons for the
setbacks which have beset the coordination of
economic policies, it should not be forgotten that
a core of monetary stability has been maintained
in the Community and that this core, namely the
Comunity 'snake , holds an unquestionable
attraction even for non-Community currencies.
Alternative methods do not, therefore, have to be
sought: it is more a matter of deciding which
new measures could be added to those already
adopted so as to .ensure that the process of
integration is pursued in a flexible and gradual
manner.
40. One method which has already been dealt
with in numerous studies would consist of gra-
dually developing a new moneVlry instrument
peculiar to the Community.
This new instrument would be issued by the
Union s monetary authority and would initially
be used solely for transactions between central
banks. At a later stage it could be given a role
enabling it:
(i) to serve as a means of settlement for finan-
cial operations between the public institutions of
the Union;
(ii) to circulate among banking institutions in
connection with certain types of private oper-
ations.
In this way, the common instrument could
progressively acquire a wider monetary
role. An important stage in this process would
be reached when the central banks began using
the Community instrument to intervene on the
exchanges.
The member countries would then have a com~
mon currency which, subject to certain con-
ditions, would circulate side by side with the
national currencies, just as nowadays foreign
currencies are used in the Community side by
side with any member country s currency. The
national currencies could retain, in relation to
each other and to the common currency, the
degree of flexibility deemed necessary in view of
the differing rates of inflation.
41. If chosen, this method would in no way
render obsolete the Community 'snake , and the
ultimate objective of stable exchange relation-
ships within the community would 
retained. However, the scope for exchange rate
adjustments could be narrowed at a slower rate
than that initially envisaged as the Community
monetary cohesion would be sustained and stim~
ulated by the existence of a common monetary
instrument.
Consequently, intra-Community exchange rela-
tionships could retain a certain degree of flexibil~
ity even after the creation of the Union and the
establishment of its institutions.
42. The choice of the method to be used to get
the movement towards monetary union under
way again is already a matter of urgency in the
Community. The choice should therefore be
made in the near future without waiting for the
establishment of the Union itself. To this end
the responsibility for introducing the new mon-
etary instrument could be entrusted to the Eur-
opean Monetary Cooperation Fund, a forerun-
ner of the future monetary authority, with the
necessary political control being exercised by the
institutions of the present Community.
When the Union is established, the monetary
authority would be given its definitive structure
and its full range of powers. The institutions of
the Union would then be responsible for the
further development of the monetary instrument.
The decision must be framed in the light of the
essential features of the Union. In this respect
the common-currency method, rather than an
unduly rapid freezing of intra-Community
exchange relationships, seems to be more in line
with the future requirements of a European
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allowing for the greatest possible flexibility for
national policies.
Experience in the Community has shown the
interdependence of monetary problems and
problems relating to the Community s economic
structures. The common-currency approach
would provide more scope for adjusting the rate
of advance towards monetary union to the
progress made in bringing economic, industrial
and regional structures closer into line.
The budget of the Union
43. The budget has many functions to perform
affecting many fields such as structural policy,
social policy, regional .. policy and short-term
economic policy.
Hitherto, efforts to direct the Member States
economic policies towards the common objective
of gradually establishing economic and monetary
union have concentrated, as regards budgetary
policy, on providing an agreed framework for
national decisions. The sums earmarked in the
Community budget have been relatively small
and their actual utilization is largely determined
by built-in mechanisms.
These efforts, which, as we have seen, should be
pursued within the Union, have, however, come
up against serious limitations, for ultimate
responsibility for and the democratic control of
expenditure are still in th~ hands of the indi-
vidual States while the decisions that could bring
about convergence of policies must be taken 
Community level. Clearly, for decision-making
and ultimate responsibility to be out of line in
this way is a constant source of conflict.
44. A more rational idea would be to provide
the Union with a larger budget which was
sufficiently flexible to allow of prompter respon-
ses to changes in the needs of the Union as a
whole, both in respect of structures (the energy
crisis is a good example of this requirement) and
in relation to overall demand management. The
budget could be used to influence economic
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trends in this way either by direct intervention
measures, or by the Union granting Member
States loans or subsidies linked to respect for the
objectives of the Union s policies.
The Union s budget would thus play an impor-
tant role in transferring resources between the
economies and in redistributing them between
social groups so as to eliminate imbalances.
45. The Union budget will probably continue
to be primarily an instrument of of structural
policy, and its role in current economic activity
will at first be extremely limited, for the total
expenditure of national and local authorities
will, for a very long time to come, remain far
higher than any expenditure that could be de~
cided on and administered at European
level. Overall demand management will there-
fore remain a very complex process, its key
features being the increasing use of common
budgetary and monetary instruments and the
provision of an agreed framework for national
policies in clearly defined areas.
The role of the Union budget as an instrument of
general economic policy would of course be
strengthened if, at a later stage in the develop-
ment of the Union, quite new categories of
expenditure could be included (e.g. infrastructure
programmes, certain social security expenditure
unemployment benefit, etc.
46. The increase in expenditure from the
Union s budget ought not in itself to speed up
the rate at which public spending as a whole is
growing. Frequently it will make possible
economies in national budgets, and a more
rational utilization of resources.
Financing the budget of the Union
47. Transforming the role of the Union budget
in this way will also mean refining the system of
own resources' by  creating a European tax
system which would be activated by a decision of
the institutions of the Union.As the measures of financial intervention by the
Union are expanded, so too will the ~resent
range of sources for financing its budget ave to
be broadened. The aim ought to be a system of
own resources which should be as s~mple as
possible and weigh equitably on the several
economies. However, the development of the
political aspects of the Union will inevitably
bring up the problem of a European tax system
which took account of the need to ensure a
balanced treatment of different social catego-
ries. . Consequently, there is a case for increas-
ing use not only of indirect taxes but .also of
certain kinds of direct taxation (for example
corporation tax). The Union should also be
able to choose to create specific Union taxes by a
special procedure probably entailing action by
the national parliaments.
A European tax system with a more varied range
of instruments could also become an additional
means of achieving redistribution so as to assist
the most needy regions and social groups.
48. As regards other revenue, the Union will
have to be able to raise loans on the capital
markets (particularly for investment and infra-
structure expenditure of common interest).
Hence the Union budget would constitute an
instrument which, when combined with the
instruments of monetary policy, would enable
action to be taken not only to improve structures
but also, to some extent at least, to influence
short-term economic trends.
The improvement of economic structures
and elimination
of economic disequilibria
49. Union action in this field will be aimed at
strengthening its economic and social structures
so as to enable it to face up to international
competition, to balance the distribution of its
economic activities and to make optimum use of
all its human and natural resources. The Union
will therefore need legislative power, exercised
flexibly in the light of national or regional
situatioqs, and will have to be capable of setting
common objectives.
SO.  As regards legislative power, stress has
already been laid on the importance of extending
the scope for direct legislation. Whenever the
use of national legislation presupposes an
advanced degree of harmonization, it would be
useful and even desirable for the Union to act
directly by legislating. Apart from cases of this
type, direct action by the Union would also be
desirable where new problems arise directly at
Community level, which therefore, in essence,
are unsolved at national level, or where policies
are being worked out which will be administered
by the Community.
51. As regards the provision of finance from
the budget, which has already been menioned in
connection with the budget of the Union, two
methods have so far been used by the existing
Communities.
The first consists of financing national pro-
grammes, carried out by the Member States
which are in line with common objectives and
are of recognized Union interest. The main idea
here is to show active solidarity to Member
States with special problems. It will also enable
certain national schemes to be related to com-
mon objectives.
The second consists of financing schemes or
policies which are specifically common in
nature. These schemes and policies can be
implemented on a decentralized basis and their
objectives can be geared to national and local
needs, while fundamental decisions on the over-
all objec#ves and the choice of operations to be
financed would be taken at Union level. This
second method enables more coherent policies to
be pursued and should be applied more and
more extensively in the Union, progressively
replacing the first method wherever possible.
52. In addition to. the provision of finance from
the Union budget, further funds could be raised
in the form of loans for financing activities of
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which will be all the more important since a real
European capital market will take quite Some
time to develop, could call for the creation of
other public finance institutions in the Union as
well as the European Investment Bank.
53. A key area for direct but selective economic
intervention is that of regional policy and land
use planning. The viability of the Union itself
will largely be conditioned by its ability to assist
all its regions in attaining an adequate and
balanced degree of development. The new
resources designed to mitigate regional disequi-
libria should contribute to making better use of
the Community territory, both from the eco-
nomic angle and from the point of view of that
idea of society which the Union must adopt.
An overall framework will be needed for land
use planning throughout the Community. It
will specify the common approach, the mutual
consistency and the links between planning
implementation, which in this field will remain
very largely free from standardization or centra-
lization.
54. Research policy is another example of
direct but selective intervention. The future
scale of research and development programmes
can no longer be met unless available resources
are used in a rational and concentrated way at
European level.
Social measures
55. By coordinating the use of the various
economic instruments at its disposal, the Union
will be able to play an increasing role, not only
in general economic policy and in removing
structural imbalances but also in employment
policy and the elimination of social inequalities.
It will also require new instruments in the
specifically social field. Economic equilibium
can be preserved only if social structures are
improved. Moreover, the exigencies of social
progress are now raising new problems whose
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scale and economic implications are such that
joint action must often be taken, or at least
national policies must be coordinated. The
Union must make an active contribution to
social progress, for otherwise it will lose the
support of a substantial sector of public opinion
in Europe, notably the workers.
This certainly does not mean that the manage-
ment of the specific instruments of social policy
will be centralized. The Union should primarily
act as a stimulus, encourage gradual harmoniza-
tion, and in some cases take direct action.
56. In particular, the Union could gradually
introduce uniform systems of minimum social
welfare. This would not, of course, prevent the
Member States from setting themselves more
ambitious objectives.
57. In some fields common policies, financed
by the Union and implemented by direct legisla-
tion, could prove useful or even indispensable.
This might well be the case for problems (e.g. the
protection of migrant workers) which are closely
linked to the Union s general economic policy
and also to relations with certain non-member
countries.
In addition, in areas in which the new problems
of modern industrial society are coming to a
head (e.g. improving working conditions and the
problems of industrial democracy), the Union
could, if given the right to adopt legislation itself
speed up and facilitate the development of new
values common to European society.
The Commission s proposals on worker partici-
pation have already helped to stimulate debate at
European level and as a result differences of
opinion in this area have become appreciably less
pronounced.
58. Finally, by increasing expenditure in the
social field (e.g. on unemployment insurance) the
Union would be able to exercise a far more
effective redistributive function and so help to
reduce economic and social disequilibria.Foreign Policy
59. The inclusion of foreign policy within the
competence of the European Union is warranted
on a number of grounds.
Firstly, as recent experience has shown in
sometimes dramatic ways, the individual Mem-
ber State are no longer capable individually of
asserting this role on the international scene with
sufficient weight and efficacy.
But when the Community and the Member
States, taking the instruments of the Treaties as a
basis, have managed to evolve a common pos-
ition, as was the case for example with the Lome
Convention, Europe has been able to exert an
incontestable influence on international relations
and the Community has been able to make an
original and active contribution to the solution
of a number of world problems.
The security of each Member State intimately
affect~ the security of the other Member States
and of the Union as a whole. Moreover, in a
political union, solidarity between the States and
between the citizens of the Union requires that
the security of each State shall be identified with
that of the Union as a whole. Hence the need
for action at international level to be coherent
and so make it possible to protect the interests of
the individual and of the whole.
60. The need to ensure, when dealing with the
outside world, that the common policies pursued
inside the Union are effective also makes it vital
in this connection for a common foreign policy
of the Union to be developed.
61. By presenting a united front, Europe would
at the same time be meeting a need felt by a
growing number of our partners, who would
already like to be able to deal with Europe as
such and regret the slowness and difficulty of our
efforts, and our consequent failure to take the
initiative.
In view of its geographical position and its
commercial and economic power, Europe is right
at the centre of some of the most critical and
delicate problems which affect the equilibrium of
the world. There would be risks if others tried
to fill the vacuum which its lack of initiative has
created in so many fields.
62. A foreign policy based primarily on bilat~
eral relations is progressively being replaced by a
system of multilateral relations, in which the
international organizations and regional group~
ings are becoming. more and more impor-
tant. For example, the Member States (or most
of them) are members of military alliances (such
as NATO), belong to international economic
organizations (OECD, GAIT, IMF, etc.) and are
increasingly active in the various organizations
of the United Nations.
The extension and reinforcement of this interna~
tional cooperation is in no way inconsistent with
asserting the Union s own role. On the con-
trary, Community experience has proved that a
united Europe can playa constructive part, and
sometimes a decisive part, in world-wide cooper~
ation and can serve as a source of equilibrium
and a factor for progress.
63. At present, however, matters coming under
the head of external relations are dealt with in
various institutional frameworks and are gov-
erned by different procedures.
Matters related to the attainment of the objec-
tives of the existing Treaties, in particular the
common commercial policy, are governed by
Community procedures and come within the
f~elds of competence of the Community institu~
tlons.
The general political aspects of international
relations are dealt with under the system of
political cooperation established between the
nine Member States of the Community.
Matters relating specifically to defence are dealt
with at NATO and in Western European Union.
! These matters are discussed under 'Defence , points
74 to 81.
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be organized coherently and given a new dimen-
sion in the Union.
64. Union action at international level would
call for:
(i) the definition of a common position and, to
this end, a continuous pooling of the Member
States' information and views on foreign policy;
(ii) on the basis of this position, an original and
active contribution by the Union to the effective
operation of the international system.
65. The development of political cooperation
alongside the various instruments available to
the Community has already enabled progress to
be made in common action. But much remains
to be done. Hitherto, political cooperation has
seldom led to anything more than the Commun-
ity reacting to events.
If these objectives are to be achieved, the first
thing to be done is to complete the elimination of
the frequently artificial distinction between Com-
munity activities and matters for political coop-
eration. This distinction makes it impossible to
deal with our problems in context or to act as
effectively as we should, while our partners are
faced with a multitude of interlocutors none of
whom is really in a position to speak for
Europe. It is not enough to try and remedy the
situation through coordination of the two struc-
tures. In the European Union, all questions of
common interest must be considered in a single
institutional framework.
66. As regards the distribution of fields of
competence between the Union and the Member
States, the final objective is a common policy
with direct attribution of powers to the Union
institutions in all areas where the Member States
acting alone cannot have as effective a voice .
would the Union acting as one, or where the
absence of a common policy would make it
impossible for the Union to pursue the objectives
of its internal development or to contribute to
international actions of interest to the Union.
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Certain matters will naturally be left entirely to
the Member States. However, the fact that the
different aspects of international relations are
closely interdependent will mean that the Union
will have concurrent competence in very many
matters. The Union would invoke its compe~
tence only when necessary, so that certain mat-
ters might, for a very long period and perhaps
indefinitely, be dealt with solely by the Member
States.
67. Taking those matters which are already
covered by the existing Treaties as a basis, it can
be seen that the only dealings with non-member
countries which are at present clearly defined are
those in the commercial policy field, in the
specific sector of Euratom, and, within a con-
fined geographical context, the association with
certain developing countries or groups of
them. There is still a tendency to interpret them
narrowly, with the result that Community policy
proper is confined within bounds which do not
permit coherent action. For instance, the Com-
munity s ability to take action in such matters as
cooperation agreements international invest-
ment, credit policy and so on is contested in
certain quarters. In view of the trend of inter-
national economic relations and the very active
role played by the governments, it is of the
utmost importance to give the Union extended
powers in this field, so that it can bring greater
political influence to bear.
68. Finally it is clear that the Member States
can act more effectively, more meaningfully and
with greater freedom in relations with the coun-
tries of the Third World when they work to-
gether than when they work separately.
Development policy will be one of the areas of
action peculiarly appropriate to integrated action
by the Union, whether the terms of direct
financial and commercial action with the Group
of 77, of its special relationship with certain of
them (ACP, Mediterranean Declaration of
Intent countries, etc.) or of its direct contribution
to international organizations dealing with devel-
opment where the Member States will have to
present a common approach.69. The Union s field of vompetence in dealing
with the outside world must cover the same
areas and be of the same nature as those it
exercises internally. For the Communities, this
principle has now been enshrined by . the Court
of Justice in its 'AETR' judgment. 1 It will have
to be ensured that the Member States are unable
to emasculate, through international commit~
ments, an internal policy still in course 
elaboration.
70. Provision will also have to be made in a
fairly general manner for the Union to be able to
act in certain fields connected with economic
integration where the establishment of a policy
vis-a-vis the outside world would itself be justi-
fied, even if there were no compelling reasons for
establishing a common policy within the Union
(for example, matters relating to sea and air
transport, already touched on in Article 84 of the
EEC Treaty).
71. Apart from these matters, and leaving aside
for the time being any anlaysis of the problems
connected with defence, there is a broad area of
international activities which are more strictly of
a political nature and which constitute a large part of the diplomatic activities of the
States. They include the recognition of States
routine diplomatic contacts, moves to bring
about international action on specific matters
and various forms of dialogue. They are all
based on a certain assessment, sometimes politi-
cal, sometimes ethical, of the international order
and its evolution. The general function of these
activities is to assert, or even ensure, the place
which States hold in the international order.
They are therefore very closely linked with
economic matters and security. In this field the
Union will have to playa role commensurate
with its international personality.
72. If a common foreign policy is to be esta-
blished the Treaty of Union must lay down
procedures for the progressive exercise of their
powers by the institutions on terms clear enough
to avoid any doubt as to the situation as between
the Union and the Member States in relations
with non-member countries and international
organizations.
How the problem is handled will obviously
depend on the international situation and the
way it develops. It will depend also on the
degri::~ of internal solidarity which the Union
may build up as a result of economic integration
and the permanent dialogue between political
forces within the institutions.
73. In the light of this analysis, the Union
institutions will have the task of preparing and
implementing joint positions and actions.
This common policy will have to be reflected in
and carried into action by diplomatic activity in
foreign capitals and international qrganiza-
tions. This poses a problem of organization of
the diplomatic machinery of the Member States
and of the Union. Already, even with the
present limited development of the Community
unity in external matters, the common attitudes
of the Member States decided at central level are
not effectively carried through in the field due to
lack of adaptation of the Member States
diplomatic techniques. These difficulties will
have to be overcome before the Union will be
abfe to take full advantage of its capacities in the
external relations field.
Initially at least, there will be no need for the
Union to have its own large-scale diplomatic
service, although it will be able to appoint
representatives to certain countries and interna-
tional organizations, where necessary, with
responsibility in particular for representing the
Union s own interests and maintaining perma-
nent close contacts with the Member States
missions for the implementation on the spot of
common decisions. Other possible improve-
ments will need to be examined, e.g. arrange-
ments for sending common instructions and
possibly even for a degree of common represen-
tation.
1 Case 22/70: (1971) Recueil, p. 263; Fifth General
Report, point 586.
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74. The gradual development of a foreign
policy for the Union, together with the growth of
its influence and the increasing part it plays in
international economic relations will, without
doubt, contribute effectively to the maintenance
of peace and help guarantee the security of the
Member States.
This will, however, have an impact on external
relations over and above the aspects already
mentioned-particularly in due course in the
field of defence.
The Atlantic Alliance plays and will continue to
playa decisive role in the security of Western
Europe, but the security of the Union, its long-
term cohesion and solidarity between its peoples
cannot be truly guaranteed if defence matters are
purely and simply left on one side when the
Union is being established.
75. All the Member States are not at present in
the same situation as regards existing defence
organizations. Ireland, for instance, is a mem-
ber neither of the Atlantic Alliance nor of
WEU. Denmark is not a member of
WEU. France, a member of the Atlantic
Alliance, no longer participates in its military
organization. The attitudes of the several Mem-
ber States of the Community to the Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty are not identical.
76. The working out of common positions in
the field of defence will have to be based on a
common view of international problems and on
the a.ch~evement of a common foreign policy in
certaIn Important areas.
A European defence policy to be considered and
accepted by the peoples of the Union, the Eur-
opean institutions will have to be recognized as
authoritative and representative of a sufficiently
high degree of solidarity between those peoples.
77. A period of strengthening the Union will be
necessary before all these conditions can be
met. One way of taking account of defence
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matters when establishing the Union would be to
make defence a field of potential competence for
the Union, which would thus not be endowed
with powers and means of action in this field
from the outset. This could only be decided
under a special procedure in which the compe-
tent institutions of the Member States would
participate in accordance with their respective
constitutional rules.
78. Such an undertaking in principle would
have some immediate repercussions.
As a potential competence would be involved
the Member States would be bound not to
en~age ,,:"ith non-member countries in actions
whIch mIght endanger the security of another
Member State or compromise the Union s long-
term cohesion. Thus, for example, those Mem-
ber States which are signatories to the Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty have interpreted it to mean that
their obligations under this Treaty shall not
prejudice the rights of a future European Union.
79. Alignment of the Member States' defence
policies would be desirable even outside the
framework of the Treaty of Union and might
even facilitate the creation of the
Union. Among the actions which could be the
first tangible signs of such an alignment could be
periodic discussions on defence problems and the
defence effort held in a truly European frame-
work with the participation of all the Member
States.
80. In addition, to pave the way for a common
policy, there could be a systematic comparison of
the strategic planning of the various countries
wit~. the aim of arriving at a common view
takIng account of the specific interests of Europe.
81. Another major step forward would be the
development of a common policy on arms and
equipment, possibly involving the setting up of a
European Arms Agency , which would bring
about a more rational use of available funds and
the industrial and technological potential of the
Member States. Expe'rience has shown that the
lack of a common policy in this field has meantthat a number of industries are excessively
dependent on sources outside the Community.
This situation not only adversely affects the
production of military equipment, and hence
Europe s scope for independence, but also cer-
tain non-military industries.
Protection  of  Human Rights
82. The democratic nature of the European
Union, which should be explicitly stated in the
Treaty of Union, means that the protection of
human rights is a fundamental element in the
new political edifice and in the operation of its
institutions.
The existing Treaties make no explicit reference
to human rights. However, the Court of Justice
has been able to fill in this gap by treating
fundamental freedoms as forming part of the
general principles of Community law. For
instance it recognized that ' the observance of
basic rights is an integral put of the general
principles of law which the Court of Justice
enforces' and that 'these rights must be safe-
guarded in the structures and objectives of the
Community, having regard to those constitution-
al traditions which are common to all Member
States . 1 ' In safeguarding these rights, the Court
is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, and it
cannot therefore uphold measures which are
incompatible with fundamental rights recognized
and protected by the Constitutions of those
States. Similarly, international treaties for the
protection of human rights on which the Mem-
ber States have collaborated or of which they are
signatories can supply guidelines which should
be followed within the framework of Commun-
ity law
The general political vocation of the European
Union and the extension of its competence to
include fields more and more closely connected
with the life of the citizen argue in favour of a
formal affirmation of human rights. They
should be given the force of rules of law which
can be applied by the courts and which the
Union institutions will have to observe when
exercising their powers and indeed promote by
adopting positive standards for their effective
implementation (this applies particularly to eco-
nomic and social rights).
The human rights to be protected
83. Although in the Europe of the Nine there is
a general consensus on the ' traditional' funda~
mental rights of the individual-civil and politi-
cal-this is not entirely the case with the rights
of 'groups of individuals' (for example , the status
of foreigners) and with ' economic and social'
rights. The indications offered by international
law are far from consistent.
It would seem, therefore, that the most suitable
approach, offering the best assurances, would be
to incorporate a list of specified rights in the
basic act on which the Union will rest.
Another, but much more limited, possibility
would be simply to include a general obligation
to respect human rights and fundamental liber~
ties. This idea, which is the one the Court
would prefer, would ensure the development of a
structure of judgments, but it would scarcely
assist in the exercise of economic and social
rights, where implementing measures of a legal
nature are necessary.
A mere reference to the provisions of the Eur-
opean Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights is also a possibility, but it would not
cover economic and social rights and would be
difficult to apply in practice.
How are these rights to be safeguarded?
84. In extension of what is already to some
extent possible in the Community, provision will
have to be made for a wide individual right of
I Judgment of 17 November 1970 in Case  11170:
(1970) Recueil
, p.
1125.
2 Judgment of 14 May 1974 in Case 4/73: (1974)
ECR, p. 508.
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mental rights protected.
The Court of Justice will necessarily have a key
role to play here.
85. Moreover, the inevitable growth of the
array of purely administrative measures taken by
the Union s institutions means that there ought
to be a system of mediation which could cont-
ribute to the settlement of confliCts between the
administrative authorities of the Union and those
under its administration.
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III. The  Institutional. Structure
of European Union
The nature  of  the institutional system
86. It is essential to consider the institutional
implications of the common policies suggested so
far.
Institutional systems reflect political realities: it
is therefore difficult at this stage to make any
concrete suggestions in this area since the sol~
utions eventually adopted will depend on devel-
opments of which it is now difficult to assess the
consequences, notably the direct election of the
European Parliament. In this chapter a number
of approaches are examined as a contribution to
future discussions.
Two possibilities can be envisaged for the institu-
tional system of the Union:
(a) A single institutional structure covering all
the fields of competence vested in the Union. 
this setup, each function (governmental, legisla-
tive, ete.) would be carried out by the same
body, whatever the field of action.
(b) Partially or totally separate bodies with
competence in the various areas or groups of
areas covered by European Union. Under this
scheme, a central body or arrangements for
coordination would ensure overall coherence.
87. The arguments in favour of the first model
are decisive.
Community experience shows how parallel orga-
nizations, such as the Community and the politi-
cal cooperation arrangements, can lead to con-
flict and overlapping, and this' has obvious
drawbacks.
In the field of external relations, only a single
organization is capable of guaranteeing the
necessary degree of consistency between the
various aspects of a policy of international
cooperation. In addition, it would make the
Union s own personality stand out more clearly
at international level.Within the Union, effective action will depend in
large measure on the possibility of always having
an overall picture of the problems of society and
of choosing the most suitable instrument in each
circumstance-and this would be difficult in too
diversified a structure.
If the second possibility were accepted, the neeq
for coordination would be so pressing that the
coordinating body or machinery would inevi-
tably become the political pivot for the entire
structure of the Union.
Support for the case in favour of a single
structure can also be found in the way the
Community system has developed. After the
establishment of the European Economic Com-
munity, the need to merge the institutions of the
three existing Communities very quickly became
evident although the actual operation was
delayed by political difficulties.
It should again be recalled that the choice of a
single structure does not mean that the institu-
tions of the Union act in all their fields of
competence in accordance with the same legal
rules.
The functions  of  the institutional system
88. The previous chapter sought to define what
would be the fields of competence and the scope
of the powers of the European Union. It is now
appropriate to consider how this definition of
competence and powers will be translated into
the tasks to be carried out by the institutions of
the Union. The list below specifies the various
functions which will fall to them:
(a) Legislative acts defining and organizing the
exercise of certain powers of the Union (where
this is not settled in the Treaty of Union)
(b) Legislative acts which may create rights and
obligations for individuals
For example, social legislation, legislation on
protection of the environment, transport legisla-
tion; legislation on the protection of individual
rights, etc.
(c) Legislative acts addressed solely to the
Member States
For example, directives on the harmonization of
national legislation; outline laws aimed at pro-
viding a frame of reference for certain national
policies (e.g. government borrowing policies).
(d) Decisions concerning the finances of the
Union
For example, approval of the budget; decisions
to allocate part of national taxes to the Union
(e.g. VAT); decisions on the creation of the
Union s own taxes; decisions on the floating of
loans by the Union.
(e) Authorization to ratify certain treaties
(f) Exercise of the right of initiative in legisla-
tive matters
(g) Executive decisions on the utilization of the
Union s own instruments
For example, directives addressed to the central
monetary authority; decisions on expenditure
under the budget; implementing decisions in
connection with the economic legislation of the
Union.
(h) Non-legislative decisions on the supervision
of  or  provision of a framework for national
policies
, For example, the 'guardian of the Treaty' func-
tion; authorization to governments to adopt
protective measures; supervision of aids.
(i) Exercise of the Union s own competence on
foreign policy matters
Definition of a Union position or of a common
position of the Member States; negotiation and
ratification of treaties; participation in interna- 
tional organizations and conferences; diplomatic
relations.
(j) Organization of cooperation between Mem-
ber States in areas not covered by a common
policy but included within the competence of the
Union
(k) Judicial acts
(1)  Decisions on the use of the Union s poten-
tial competence
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bers
(n) Decisions amending the basic act
89. This list of varied tasks shows the need for
the institutional system of the Union to include
the fundamental functions of a state-like political
organization, i.e. a legislative function, a govern-
mental function, a judicial function, procedures
for revision of the constitution. Moreover, the
structure of the Union must make it possible to
organize and implement cooperation between
Member States.
It is to be noted here that this list of tasks to be
carried out by the institutions does not claim to
set out precise criteria for the detailed separation
of powers between the different bodies. Al-
though the principle of the separation of powers
is one held by all the Member States and thus
one to be embodied in the European Union, its
practical application in the different constitu-
tional systems concerned has varied mark-
edly. This is particularly true as regards the
division between legislative and governmental
functions.
Consequently, the Commission s intention in this
document is not to set out the framework for a
constitution but merely to highlight the major
characteristics of an institutional system for the
Union.
The task of laying down detailed criteria for the
separation of powers in the Union with regard to
past experience in the different Member States
but also in the light of the original features of the
European Union will fall to the future con-
stituent members of the Union, and this will be
one of their most difficult tasks.
90. There are some major differences between
the institutional problems of the European Union
and those of the EEC, or at least those which
arose during the creation of the common mar-
ket. The main task during this period was the
attainment of specific objectives, a process which
has been described as 'passive integration , i.
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the removal of barriers to the free movement of
factors of production. A great many provisions
of the Treaty had this as their sole objective.
The establishment of European Union, by con-
trast, will occur when the main aim will be to
implement common policies and action-a pro-
cess of 'active integration
91. The institutional system informing the EEC
Treaty is based essentially on the combination of
the Commission right of initiative and the
Council's decision-making power. The Com-
mission is further responsible for seeing that
Community rules are respected and also has
certain executive tasks. The Parliament has so
far played a mainly advisory role.
The Council, with a certain ambiguity, has both
legislative and governmental responsibilities
while other governmental functions are carried
out by the Commission. In the Community
system, then, there is no separation between
legislative and governmental functions.
92. European Union will not dispose of the
need for dialogue between institutions responsi-
ble for the common interest and institutions
representing national interests, which has been a
feature of the Community.
If the institutions of the Union are granted
powers of their own which are greater than those
of the Communities (and it is recognized that
this will be one consequence of the implementa-
tion of economic and monetary union), this will
mean that the decision~making institutions must
be given a maximum of democratic legitimacy
-with greater powers being vested in a directly
elected European Parliament, for instance.
At the same time the legislative and governmen-
tal functions of the European Union will have to
be defined in a more rational manner; this would
be in line with the more political character of the
Union and increase the effectiveness of the insti-
tutions. One reason for the lack of effectiveness
of the present institutions is the ambiguity sur-
rounding the role of the Council.93. This then prompts consideration of the real
meaning of the passage in the Paris communique
stating that the European Union mus~ be set up
with the fullest respect for the TreatIes already
signed' It does not seem reaso~able to construe
this as meaning that the creation of European
Union should not involve any institutional
changes. On the contrary, the political discus-
sions at the Paris Summit and the reference in the
same communique to the need to transform the
relations of Member States would suggest that
the creation of European Union must be accom-
panied by institutional changes.
The Commission interprets 'the fullest respect
for the Treaties' as expressing concern that the
European Union should not be a step backward
compared with the existing institutional struc-
ture but rather a reinforcement. It also implies
that the institutional system of the Union should
be based on the existing institutions.
Setting-up the institutional system
94. Two approaches are possible:
(i) Establishment of the European U~ion, would
not involve immediate and far-reachIng InStitu-
tional reform, but the institutional system would
be changed step by step as the fields of compe-
tence of the Union were gradually enlarged.
(ii) From the very outset, there ~ould be insti-
tutional reform, on a scale suffiCient to ensure
that the new institutions provide a structure in
which the Union can exercise and gradually
increase its powers and guide developments over
a fairly long period.
Although evolution by stages . is conceiv~ble i!l
well-defined areas (such as tanff dIsmantlIng), 
seems hardly possible to apply it to so complex a
phenomenon as an institutional struture.
If the institutional system of the Union is to
constitute a structure within which political
forces will develop a truly European dialogue, it
will have to ha a certain stability and not be
subject to frequent change.
The second approach, that of the qualitative leap
forward, has a number of advantages. This was
the method chosen by the authors of the Rome
and Paris Treaties when they provided .for the
new institutions to be set up once the Treaties
entered into force.
However, the setting up of a complete institu-
tional structure from the outset does not mean
that the structure itself must be definitive. The
aim would be to set up the political organs
required to enable the Union over a period which
will, of necessity, be rather long, gradually to
assume effective responsibility in its various
fields of competence.
This period of time will allow real political
relations, which will be determined by the bal-
ance between the political forces, to develop
between the various organs. After the initial
stage, and depending on political developments
there is no reason why the institutions of the
Union should not be reviewed .as fully as neces-
sary.
The institutional structure
95. The institutional debate within the Com-
munity has revolved around two major pr~b-
lems. First, the election of a European Parlia-
ment by universal suffrage and the conferment
upon it of, legislative powers. Second, the orga-
nization of the executive function. 
European Union means nothing if it does not
involve the development of a European govern-
mental executive. The Commission sees the
European Government as an executive body with
political authority, room for manreuvre and
powers (in the sectors where the Union has
powers of its own) comparable with those nor-
mally possessed by a Government-a body
which would carry out its at::tivities under the
supervision of a Parliament to which it would be
responsible.
Point 16 of the final communique; Sixth General
Report, point 5; Bull. EC 10-1972, Part One, Chap-
ter I.
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would be appropriate at this stage to concentrate
on the problems raised by the organization of the
executive and legislative powers and by their
interrelationship. A number of considerations
will also be set out concerning the judicial power
of the Union.
The Commission is' aware that other major
problems exist. At present, in particular, the
need for the two sides 'of industry to be more
closely involved in economic and social de-
cision-making is becoming more and more evi-
dent and has already been acknowledged in the
present Community. Consideration will have to
be given to how this can be done in the Union
with particular emphasis on whether it should be
provided for in the basic texts of the Union, and
whether this requirement can be satisfied by a
legislative act, or in the context of the day-to-
day functioning of the institutions, or even by
creating bodies on the lines of the Committee on
Employment. The Commission does not, how-
ever, consider the time ripe for formulating any
precise ideas, particularly while labour and
management themselves have not made their
views known. It will take special interest in the
suggestions which will doubtless be set out by
the Economic and Social Committee in its
Opinion addressed to Mr Tindemans.
97. The various formulas possible for the orga-
nization of the executive and legislative powers
can be reduced to three main models.
First model
98. The governmental organ of the Union
would consist of ministers from the national
governments who would devote themselves to
European affairs. The European Government
would therefore develop out of the present
Council, without its legislative functions, and
would of course have to operate on a permanent
basis.
The executive and administrative responsibilities
of the Commission would be transferred to the
European Government, as would the corres-
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ponding administration. The existence of such
a Government would lead to the disappearance
of the existing Commission as an independent
political institution (without, however, preclud-
ing the existence of an autonomous body to
reflect on and make suggestions concerning Eur-
opean affairs).
99. Legislative power would be exercised by a
Parliament, which should probably be bicameral
Chamber of Peoples' and ' Chamber of
States ). The Chamber of Peoples should be
elected by direct universal suffrage.
100. In this model each member of the Eur-
opean Government would derive his constitu-
tional status from the national govern-
ments. There would be no problems as to the
relationship between the executive s and the
legislature s responsibilities, as each institution of
the Union would have a completely independent
constitutional basis.
Second model
101. The governmental organ would be a col-
legiate body whose members would be indepen-
dent of the national governments.
European Government of this type would
naturally absorb all the executive functions of
the Council and the executive and administrative
functions of the present Commission, as well as
its power of initiative. The Commission would
thus cease to exist.
102. For the legislative power, a bicameral
system seems indispensable (Chamber of Peoples
and Chamber of States). The Chamber of
States should be designated by the national
governments.
103. As regards relations between the executive
and the legislature, consideration should first be
given to how the executive is to be appointed.
This involves guaranteeing its legitimacy, auth-
ority and homogeneity.There are three main possible systems.
der the first system the Chamber elected by
unIversal suffrage would be chiefly responsible
for appointing the Government (or Head 
Government).
Under the second system, however, this respon-
sibility would be given to the Chamber of States
although the European Government would b~
responsible to the elected Chamber and could
therefore be censured by it.
Under the third system the two Chambers would
choose the Government jointly. For instance
the Chamber of States could appoint the Head of
the Eur?pean Government, the appointment to
be confirmed by the elected chamber (which
means that the Chamber of States would have to
take account of the political composition of the
elected Chamber). The Head of Government
would then appoint his own team, which would
be responsible to the elected Chamber (right of
censure).
The first system is very similar to the constitu-
tional practice of several Member States. It is
doubtful, ho~ever, ~het~erat the present stage
. European l~tegratlon It would be possible to
elimInate entIrely the influence of Member
States' representatives in the formation of the
Government.
~he second system, which would give the na-
tional governments prime responsibility for the
formation of the Government, could lead to the
same lack of legitimate authority with which the
present institutions are often reproached. Fur-
thermore, the Chamber of Peoples' right of
censure would lose much of its significance if the
Chamber were not allowed to participate in
forming the government.
The aim of the third system is to establish a
balance between the role of the two Chambers
in other words between the elected representa
tives on the one hand and the Member States on
the other.
In assessing the various systems a number of
other factors should be taken into consideration
for instance the duration of the Government
term of office, the compatibility of membership
of the Government with membership of the
European Parliament, the possibility of Parlia-
ment being dissolved if a motion of censure
against the Government were adopted, and so
on.
104. As regards the exercise of legislative pow-
ers, the problem of defining the respective roles
of the two Chambers arises.
The establishment of a bicameral system does
not necessarily imply that both Chambers would
have the same responsibilities and powers in all
fields. Even if, for a number of matters, a
system of joint decision-making seems desirable
ther~ will be matters (e.g. budgetary powers
foreIgn policy) on which for reasons of
efficiency or other political desiderata the res~
pective roles of the two Chambers would have to
be differentiated.
This could be done in several ways: for instance
by granting one of the Chambers sole compe-
tence or by giving it the final say in certain fields
or by laying down rules governing the power o
am~~dment and the majority required for taking
decIsIOns.
It is .not expedient here to analyse the possible
solutions and the fields in which the different
procedures would be applied. This is a task
that will fall to those who will have to draw up
the constitution of the Union, and the report by
the European Parliament will natUrally be of
considerable importance in this respect.
Third model
105. The structure of the executive and legisla-
tive organs of the Union would be as in the
second model, but there would be an additional
body-the 'Committee of Ministers in which
the representatives of the governments would
have a seat and whose duties would include
taking part in the procedure by which certain
decisions of the European Government were
adopted.
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already been envisaged in the draft treaty estab-
lishing a European Political Community,t would
be justified by the fact that the European Gov~
ernment will only gradually develop the real
substance of its legitimate authority, that is to
sayan efficient political contact with the forces
of political life and with public opinion.
Moreover, while the Union was at an early stage
in the development of its fields of competence
the Committee of Ministers would have to act in
spheres where the Member States would still
wield considerable powers and retain wide
responsibilities.
107. However, the activity of this body must
not be such as to cancel out the progress
achieved by the setting-up of a European Gov-
ernment as a political institution with its own
powers and its proper constitutional back-
ground.
Mandatory intervention by the Committee of
Ministers could perhaps be limited to specific
problems and might possibly be no more than a
transitional arrangement. The Eutopean Gov-
ernment would always be able, on its own
initiative, to seek the opinion of the Committee.
108. The rules on intervention by the Commit-
tee of Ministers could vary with the subject
matter. A number of systems can be envisaged
on the basis of the experience of the Commun-
ities. Formulas could thus be adopted such as
the ordinary opinion or the assent of the ECSC
Treaty, or else the procedure used in the
Management Committees and other similar
Committees which have been developed in the
EEc.
109. One may be inclined to think that, in this
model, a role in the elaboration of government
decisions could be entrusted to the Chamber of
States in order to avoid an unduly ponderous
institutional structure. This solution, although
apparently simpler and more efficient, would
however mean that the Chamber of States would
have at once both legislative and governmental
functions.
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110. The first model, if adopted, would have
several drawbacks and would not herald any real
improvement on the current situation. The
Government of the Union would in substance be
an intergovernmental body. When it is remem-
bered that within the Union it is in this body that
cooperation between Member States would have
to be organized, it seems clear that it would be
very difficult for this European Government to
develop the characteristics of an institution cap-
able of exerting a common political resolve with
the continuity and efficiency required for action
by a genuine government. Consequently, this
first model seemS more suited to a Union which
is based primarily on cooperation and the ap-
proximation of national policies than to a Union
wh~ch, developing and improving on the existing
Communities, would he based primarily on the
pursuit of common policies and the exercise of
its own powers.
111. The second and third models therefore
seem more in keeping with the basic characterist-
ics of the Union as they seem to emerge from the
political intentions so far expressed by the insti-
tutions , as set out in Chapter 
The second model has the advantage of greater
clarity with regard to the distribution of pow-
ers. It does, of course, imply a very ambitious
development as regards the transfer of powers
from the Member States to the institutions of the
Union. Moreover, it would require an appro-
priate place to be found in the Union s institu-
tional structure for the organization of cooper-
ation between the Member States.
The third model would require a less ambitious
change in character and provide a more satisfac-
tory solution to the problem of organizing coop-
eration. However, it involves a more ponde-
rous institutional structure. It also involves a
risk that intervention by the Committee of Min-
isters might undermine the effectiveness of gov-
ernment action.
I Adopted 
by the  ad hoc  Assembly in March  1953.
Points 26 to 85.The choice between the second and third models
is essentially political.
The Commission considers that the second
model would be the one best suited to the needs
of the fully-fledged Union. The third model 
however appropriate for a limited transitional
period.
112. On the other hand, the possibility must be
rejected of other mixed formulas with regard to
the composition of the European Government, in
which, for instance, some of its members would
represent the national governments while others
would be elected on an independent basis. This
type of formula would lead toa hybrid organ
which would be subject tQ constant internal
strains as a result of the varying status of its
members, and there would therefore be the risk
of a permanent political impasse.
113. A number of specific problems raised by
the institutional structure of the Union are dis-
cussed below.
The initiative  in  legislation
114. The governmental body should obviously
have power to initiate legislation. But should
these powers be extended to the parliamentary
bodies and perhaps to the States? And, if so, in
what fields?
115. For the Parliament, it would be reason-
able to grant members of the Chamber 
Peoples the right to initiate legislation, subject to
appropriate reservations as regards new expendi-
ture.
If the Parliament were to include a Chamber of
States designated by the national governments
the question would arise whether the right to
initiate legislation should be granted to the
delegations of individual Member States. Since
the Communities have had no experience in this
area the Commission would advocate caution
here.
116. The Commission decided not to go any
further into this issue pending an opinion from
the European Parliament. 
The Court  of  Auditors
117. The European Court of Auditors, to be set
up once existing proposals to amend the Treaty
are approved, would obviously continue to func-
tion in liaison with the institutions of the Union
to allow both Chambers to exercise democratic
control over Union spending.
Organization  of  cooperation
between Member  States  in the Union
118. The organization of cooperation should
vary with the model adopted.
119. In the first model, the structure of the
planned governmental organ suggests that it
could be an appropriate framework in which to
organize cooperation. However this would
have the drawback of stressing the fact that the
members of the governmental organ were
national ministers, whereas the organization
envisaged in this model should bring out the
European aspect of their duties.
120. In the second model, the simplest formula
would be for the governmental organ to arrange
case by. case, the requisite meetings between
representatives of the Member States (ministers
or senior officials) with a view to organizing the
desired cooperation. It will be noted that the
Chamber of States, although designated by the
governments, would not be an appropriate
framework because of its legislative function and
because its fixed composition would not neces-
sarily enable it to deal with the matters arising
under cooperation arrangements.
121. The Committee of Ministers for which the
third model provides would seem to be the ideal
framework for cooperation activities.
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122. The Heads of Government have had to
play an increasing role in European decision-
making because of the weakness of the present
structures and the need for political agreement at
the highest level on ambitious objectives which
in many cases go beyond the terms of the
Treaties.
The creation of new institutions and the defin-
ition of new aims should inject new dynamism
into the structures of the Union.
However, the role of Heads of Government will
be even more crucial during the Community
advance towards European Union. Once new
institutions have been set up meetings of Heads
of Government should be limited to dealing with
the most difficult political problems which will
continue to arise.
Constitutional procedures
123. The Act of Constitution should .obviously
lay down special constitutional procedures for
the reform of that act and for the accession of
new members. These procedures should pro-
vide for participation by all the institutions of
the Union and by the Member States in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional pro~
cedures.
The judiciary and the review
of  legality and constitutionality
124. The Commission has noted with great
interest the views on European Union expressed
by the Court of Justice in its report of 15 July
1974. The Court recalls that the Community is
governed by the rule of law and emphasizes that
any future development of the Community must
likewise satisfy this condition; a genuine system
in which the rule of law applies requires ' binding
rules which apply uniformly and which pr?tect
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courts and tribunals of some countries make use
of this procedure much more frequently than
those of other countries.
Two lines can be taken to find a remedy for this:
(a) laying down an appropriate penalty against
any judgment delivered by national courts which
failed to refer the matter to the Court in breach
of a rule requiring them to do so (obligatory
action for default or a direct application to the
Court of Justice by the parties concerned): this is
the solution favoured by the Court;
(b) allowing the parries concerned a right of
appeal to the Court from judgments of national
courts which have ruled on a point of Union law
without referring the matter to the Court
(whether or not this is compulsory).
The first solution is more stringent since it
penalizes any infringement of the Article 177
procedure, but it is confined to cases which
national courts are bound to refer to the Court
of Justice. The advantage of the second is that
it gives the final word to the Court of Justice in
all cases, not merely cases which national courts
have omitted to refer.
126. In view of the broad scope of the Union
authority, even fuller consideration should be
given to the role of the judiciary in the Union
than has been done in the existing Commun-
ities. There is indeed a case for making a
judicial system peculiar to the Union itself solely
responsible for admil1istering at least part of the
law deriving from the Union institutions. If this
thesis were accepted, there would be no need to
decide once and for all which sectors of Union
law should be withdrawn from the jurisdiction
of national courts. The Union s constitution
could provide that the legislature of the Union
settles this question itself when legislation is
being drafted.
The Court s report does not contain any sugges-
tion of this kind. It should be pointed out
however, that the suggestion does not conflict
with the requirement of a single supreme court
put forward by the Court. A single Union
Court could ensure unity of interpretation both
in the fields left to the national courts and those
entrusted exclusively to the Union s own Court.
Review of legality and constitutionality
127. In the Communities of today, the powers
of the Court of Justice already include some that
are similar to those of a Council of State or a
Constitutional Court. When the Community
institutions, the Member States or, within certain
, limits, private persons bring an action before it
the Court has the power to declare invalid both
administrative and legislative acts of the Com-
munity which are not in conformity with the
Treaties;! moreover, it has the power to declare
whether or not the Member States have failed to
fulfil their obligations under the Treaties, in
which case the State is obliged to comply with
the judgment of the Court.2 At the request of a
national court, it also has jurisdiction to give
preliminary rulings on the validity and the inter-
pretation of Community law, thereby enabling
the national court to put aside any Community
acts that are invalid or any national acts which
are incompatible with Community law.
As this system has proved its worth it should be
confirmed and developed. The constitutional
aspect of the Court s power to review the legality
of acts would obviously come more clearly to the
fore in respect of the Union s legislative acts once
these came from an elected parliament. The
Court shares this view.
128. The present system is marked by an
obvious imbalance between the wide power
vested in the Court to declare Community acts
invalid and the more limited powers which it has
in respect of acts of the Member States under
Articles 169 to 171 and 177. It seems logical to
restore the balance by conferring on the Court
the power to declare invalid acts of the Member
! . Articles 173 to 175 of the EEC Treaty.
Articles 169 to 171.
Article 177.
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action is brought before the COUljt by the institu-
tions of the Union or the other Member States or
when national courts request preliminary rulings.
On the other hand the Court, with the same aim
of strengthening its judgment against a default-
ing State, proposes that:
(a) the judgment specify those steps which that
State is invited to take;
(b) enforcement of the judgment be subject to
systematic control;
(c) 'any advantages sought by the State con-
cerned should be conditional upon its rectifica-
tion in the future
The second suggestion is certainly acceptable;
the way in which the otber two are formulated
poses a number of problems and would need
some clarification. It should be emphasized
however, that the above suggestion also meets
the ends pursued by the Court.
129. The present system is also at fault because
of the limits imposed on actions brought by
private persons.
(a) It is perfectly understandable that the right
to bring actions before the Court in order to
have  Community  acts of a general character
declared invalid should be limited to the Com-
munity institutions and the Member States and
that private persons should as a rule only be able
to institute proceedings against decisions which
are of individual concern to them. In a Eur-
opean Union it would be necessary to distinguish
between a review of the constitutionality of
legislative acts passed by an elected parliament
for which this limitation would be maintained,
and a review of the legality of regulations issuing
from the executive, which, as suggested by the
Court, could, like individual decisions, be the
subject of actions brought 'by private parties
having a direct interest, as is the case in the legal
systems of several of the Member States
(b) To the extent that private persons have
under national law the right to ask the courts to
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set aside  national  acts contrary to Community
law, it would seem that it is not essential to grant
them this right before the Court of Justice.
(c) One. point in the future Union which is not
very satisfactory for private persons is the
absence of a guarantee that the Court of Justice
would intervene in the matter of the  validity
under Union law of Community or national acts
invoked during proceedings before national
courts. At present such matters are brought
before the Court only in the form of requests for
preliminary rulings, and the national court has
the exclusive right to decide whether or not it is
necessary or advisable to refer the question to
the Court. Moreover, the Court cannot deal
with the claims of private persons who invoke
Community provisions which are not ' directly
applicable
In a model where the balance will of necessity be
a delicate one between the Union and its Mem-
ber States, the demarcation of spheres of action
will not come about without some degree of trial
and error for a long time to come. This being
so it would be useful, in order to help the
situation settle down more rapidly, to give pri-
vate persons broad access to the courts to
challenge the constitutionality of the acts of the
Union and of the States in the light of the Treaty
of Union not only in national courts of law or
administrative tribunals but also by appeal to the
Court of Justice, irrespective of whether or not
the rules of Union law concerned are directly
applicable.
The Court also favours a strengthening of the
right of appeal for private persons.IV. Moving Towards Union
by Reactivating the Building
of Europe
130. The scale of the effort required if Eur-
opean Union is to be .achieved becomes all the
more dear when one compares the magnitude of
the objective with the difficulties that the Com-
munity is currently experiencing.
In spite of the undeniable successes which fol-
lowed the first years of the Community and
which led to its enlargem~nt, and in spite of the
growing interest shown by a large number of
non-member countries in establishing increasing-
ly close cooperation with the Community, the
idea of Europe seems to have lost much of its
strength and initial momentum.
131. Too many ambitious programmes have
been announced only to be followed by all too
modest achievements or even by failure.
Sometimes, in spite of the efforts made, it was
found that disagreement on basic issues was
insurmountable. Sometimes the programmes
envisaged came up against the structural differ-
ences between the Member States which, in some
cases, proved a serious obstacle to progress.
Often, however, failure was due to unwillingness
on the part of governments, although fully aware
of the need for joint action, to give the Commun~
ity institutions the necessary means of action
thus lapsing into mere intergovernmental cooper~
ation.
Deprived in this way of its inner driving force
the Community has been unable to keep up
effectively with changes in European society.
Public opinion, while still generally in favour of
Europe as a unity, has gradually ceased to regard
the Community as a political venture in its own
right and has become increasingly sceptical.
Moreover some sections of the public still have
reservations about the way the Community has
developed.
132. European Union will never be achieved
unless vigorous action is taken to convince social
and political forces of its necessity and of the
benefits it will bring.
The first priority must be to restore credibility
and relevance to the common venture.
This will involve a new drive to demonstrate the
practical advantages of common policies to the
Member States as a whole and the institutional
changes that will be needed for those policies to
be properly framed and carried out.
133. The need now is to resume and intensify
this effort by measures which, without a com-
plete upheaval of the present structures, will help
give them a new impetus within the perspective
of European Union.
Development in this direction could be furthered
by:
(a) the election of the European Parliament by
direct universal suffrage which, by enhancing the
democratic legitimacy of the Community ven-
ture, would also prepare the way for further
progress in the institutional field; ratification of
the Convention approved by the European Par-
liament,l an election campaign which should be
brought forward as much as possible, and the
activities of the elected European Parliament
would spark off a continuing debate between
political, economic and social forces, national
governments and the European institutions 
define the basic objectives and content of Eur-
opean Union;
(b) fresh steps taken to reactivate common
policies are also an important part of the desired
development.
The election of the European Parliament
and the other related institutional  measures
134. This objective is laid down in the existing
Treaties. Most of the Member States agreed in
principle at the Conference of Heads of Govern-
ment held in Paris last December that it should
S. 5/75be attained by 1978. The European Parliament
put forward a new draft Convention in January
1975.
The Commission considers that those. States
which maintained their reservations should now
lift them and that work on the Convention
should begin without delay, so that elections can
be held as soon as possible.
135. The introduction of this new factor of
direct legitimacy into the institutional system
would take on even greater importance if it were
supplemented by futher measures, as regards the
powers of the European Parliament which, by
strengthening the latter s role, would increase the
interest in direct elections of both politicians and
public opinion.
136. The Commission feels that the most
promising of the various conceivable measures
would be to expand the consultation procedure
agreed between the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission for acts having
financial implications. This procedure could be
extended to other fields of legislative activity in
the way suggested by the Vedel Working Party.
The 'Europeaan Council'
13 7. Pending the setting-up of new institutions
for the European Union, the 'European Council'
will be increasingly called on to act in the
context of the present institutions as a driving
and a guiding force and as a decision-making
body on matters of major importance. It will
also be its task to guarantee, by its political
authority, the common will to attain the objec-
tives of reactivation.
The reactivation  of  common policies
138. The Commission feels that efforts to
strengthen the Community should concentrate in
the first instance on existing common policies, all
the facilities provided by the Treaties being
exploited to the full. It attaches great impor-
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tance to pressing ahead with the task of adapting
the common agricultural policy to changed. cir-
cumstances.
Externally the Community must playa full part
in international negotiations, act with greater
cohesion and take the initiative more frequently
than hitherto on problems which are of vital
interest to it as for example, economic develop-
ment and stability in the Mediterranean. It
must pursue and expand its policy towards
developing countries, taking the Lome Conven-
tion as a starting point.
Obviously a detailed programme for the reacti-
vation of common policies cannot be included in
this report. The Commission has confined itself
to outlining a number of initiatives which, while
remaining within the framework of the existing
Treaties, would constitute important political
steps towards European Union.
Economic and social matters
139. The Community s most urgent task is to
restore confidence and stability at a time when
most managements, unions and consumers are
baffled by present developments and are anxious
as to what the future may hold in store.
In the short t~rm, the first priority is to streng-
then aru:l' improve the mutual consistency of
national policies, for it is essentially at this level
that solutions must be found at the present stage
of the Community s development.
140. Short-term policies are frequently hamp-
ered by the unstable relationships which have
developed between Community currencies.
Ways and means must be found of reducing this
instability; and this means that the Community
monetary system needs revising 
Bull. EC 1-1975, point 2501. 
Report of the Working Party examining the Prob-
lem of the Enlargement of the Powers of the European
Parliament (Vedel Report); Supplement 4/72  Bull.
Ec.such a way as to enable all the Member States
currencies to participate in complete safety.
Not only intervention facilities, but also financ-
ing mechanisms must be reviewed. Short-term
financial support and medium-term financial
assistance, and the Community loan arrange-
ments, will also have' important roles to play.
It is also essential that t~e widest possible use be
made of the European unit of account, not only
in the Community s fin~ncial transactions but
also on world financial markets.
The aim of greater mqnetary stability will call
for effective control of liquidity growth and of
budgetary policies, which means that the role of
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund will
have to be extended.
141. Yet monetary instability is merely a reflec-
tion of more deep-rooted economic differen-
ces. Only when these can be reduced can the
Community hope to achieve really stable
exchange rates. More active steps will have to
be taken to narrow down these differences
which could well be aggravated further at the
present juncture by uncoordinated industrial
policies. This entails Community action
through the budget to mitigate structural imbal-
ances. In this context existing agencies, such as
the Social Fund, the Regional Fund and the EIB
could be used, and new ones set up.
142. Some of these agencies can help the Com-
munity to speak with one voice in its response to
problems in the field of energy. The key
problem here is how to define and encourage the
required investment in Community energy
resources and in new industrial schemes to
reduce energy consumption. Investment here
will be on such a scale that Community financ-
ing will be needed, either through existing chan-
nels (especially the ECSC and EIB) or new
channels still to be opened (e.g. Euratom
loans). In some cases, the Community may
have to give general guarantees that will ensure
the profitability of investment. Action along
these lines will allow the Community to develop
its potential in a vital sector of the economy and
thus enhance its ability to adopt other measures
required for transition to European Union.
143. There is another specific area-export
credits-where there is a need to speed up
harmonization. A specifically Community instru-
ment may also prove necessary here. Differing
principles and practices in the Member States
constitute an obstacle to a coherent Community
policy in this field and reduce the effectiveness of
support which can be given to Community
exporters.
144. The elimination of imbalances will take
time. A medium-term strategy will have to be
evolved to provide a more ordered view of the
future.
When this strategy is being defined, consider-
ation will have to be given to the possible and
desirable rate and nature of economic growth
and the best way of restoring the fundamental
equilibria.
This overall policy, which will include social and
structural measures, will have to he formulated
within the framework of a Community medium-
term policy programme.
Another point is that facilities for research into
and analysis of economic and social structures
will have to be further developed at Community
level.
145. Given the efforts and sacrifices entailed by
this medium-term programme, it is essential that
the two sides of industry should be more closely
involved in the preparation of decisions on social
and economic issues. There is a real need to set
up a general framework for the purposes of
ensuring permanent dialogue between govern-
ments institutions and the two sides of
industry. Without impinging on the role of the
Economic and Social Committee, the role of the
Committee on Employment should be streng-
thened.
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146. The Community currently faces a series of
major problems-particularly as regards energy,
raw materials and the general relationship
between industrialized and developing countries.
The Community should make immediate use, of
the powers it already holds to. strengthen its
action in tackling these urgent problems while
bearing in mind the objectives of Union in 
external relations context.
147. A first need is that the Community
powers should not be interpreted in a restrictive
way, as is often tried at present. The Commun-
ity must be permitted to express itself fully in
fields where its role is now contested.
The Community must also be given new instru-
ments with which to act. In view of the change
international economic relations, the Com-
munity as such should be in a position to
conclude economic cooperation agreements
where appropriate.
These agreements, such as the one which the
Commission has proposed to negotiate with
Canada, would not rule out the possibility of
national agreements but in fact place them in the
frame work of a coherent policy.
They would prevent a situation arising where
uncoordinated policies implemented at national
level neutralized the efforts of the various indivi-
dual countries or even led to harmful repercus-
sions on economic interpenetration within the
Community. The implementation by the Com-
munity of cooperation agreements would on the
other hand represent a further reinforcement of
internal solidarity and economic interpenetra-
tion. As a case in point, it is probable that
concluding agreements with countries which pro-
duce raw materials would in certain cases facil-
itate stable supplies for Europe as part of a
system of reciprocal benefits.
148. Subsequently, greater effort will have to
be devoted to defining and upholding common
positions and to speaking with a single voice in
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international negotiations. This is particularly
important in the monetary and financial negotia-
tions, as in the forthcoming international talks
on the whole complex of relations with develop-
ing countries, energy and raw materials. Only
in this way wilt the Community be able to play
its full role in determining the new balance
between industrialized and developing countries.
149. Finally, the process of political cooper-
ation should be strengthened to enable the Nine
to take common initiatives in the international
field.
Procedure for the attainment
of  European Union
150. The attainment of these 'objectives is
neither a transitional phase nor a first step
towards European Union.
Commitment to these objectives is however a
precondition for the major step that the creation
of European Union represents. The achieve-
ment of European Union will require the defin-
ition of new objectives, the transformation of the
institutional system and the explicit granting to
the institutions of new competences and new
powers.
151. While the Commission would like to see
the institutional issue settled and competences
defined from the outset, it recognizes that the
Union will only exercise its new powers and
implement its new policies gradually, with an
evolution over a relatively long period.
All these changes and commitments should how-
ever be enshrined in the Act of Constitution, in
the form of a new Treaty. In this context
consideration must be given to procedures for
drafting and approving the new Treaty with a
view to subsequent ratification by the Member
States in accordance with their respective consti-
tutional requirements.152. A number of methods are conceivable, but
they can be reduced to two main formulas
depending on which body is given the politically
determining role.
These are discussed below but the Commission
reserves the right to review its ideas as the debate
on European Union develops.
153. In the first formula, the central role in the
preparation of the new Treaty would be given to
a conference of representati"es of the Member
States.
In this case, it would be possible to follow the
procedure under Article 236 of the Treaty, which
provides for a proposal from the Commission
consultation of the European Parliament and
preparation of a final draft by a conference of
representatives of the Member States.
154. In the second formula, this central role
would be played by institutions representing the
Community and our countries. The Union
Constitution might, for instance, be drafted, on
the basis of general guidelines laid down by the
European Council', by an elected European
Parliament. The Constitution, in Treaty form
would be referred by the Member States' govern-
ments to the national Parliaments for ratification
in accordance with each country s own constitu-
tional requirements.
During the drafting process the national govern-
ments and the Commission would, of course, be
able to contribute to the debate in Parliament
either at their own initiative or at Parliament
request.
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